ACADEMIC RESEARCH • 學術研究 2023 UMAGAZINE 28 • 澳大新語 53 With rising geopolitical tensions, global economic integration poses a multitude of risks. Countries are increasingly dependent on each other for the supply of important goods, services, and technologies. Supply chain disruptions during the coronavirus pandemic have brought to light these vulnerabilities that are now increasingly exploited to attain various political, economic, and even military objectives. For the European Union (EU), the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ embedded in the EU’s New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 signifies its capacity to act independently in strategically important policy areas ranging from defence to healthcare. Promoting Domestic Production and Reducing Dependencies Under its ‘strategic autonomy’ agenda, the EU aims to promote its economic competitiveness, protect itself from economic security risks, and partner with a wider range of countries for mutually beneficial economic relations. In pursuit of these objectives, it has adopted a number of industrial policies stimulating domestic production capabilities and reducing external supply dependencies. For example, the EU Chips Act aims to bolster the EU’s production capacity in semiconductors, targeting up to 20 per cent of the global market share by 2030. In addition, the proposed EU Critical Raw Materials Act promotes the diversification of supplies of critical raw materials and aims to improve sustainability and circularity through waste collection and recycling. The proposed EU Net-Zero Industry Act would support the EU’s Green Deal Industrial Plan by encouraging investments in ‘green technologies’ and promoting their manufacturing in the EU. Economic Security and Foreign Investment Scrutiny The EU is not alone in intertwining economic and security interests. Countries all over the world are continuously ‘securitising’ their economic relations to ensure resilience and reduce critical dependencies. At the same time, the EU attempts to balance its de-risking policies and its commitment to maintaining its open economy grounded on the four freedoms of the EU internal market: free movement of goods, free movement of people, freedom of capital, and freedom of establishment. Among the four freedoms, the freedom of capital is guaranteed not only to European citizens and businesses but also to investors from third countries. However, the pursuit of strategic autonomy and the implementation of de-risking policies will inevitably affect the exercise of the freedom of capital by foreign investors, particularly Chinese firms operating in Europe. As the domains of security and public order fall under the exclusive competence of its member states, the EU coordinates the scrutiny of foreign investment using its common commercial policy powers related to external economic relations with other countries. For example, the European Commission carries out control over corporate mergers and acquisitions of a certain size that could potentially affect competition in the EU internal market. If such competition concerns exist, the Commission may require companies to modify their planned transaction or even prohibit it. While the EU merger control is ownership-neutral, not distinguishing between private and state-owned companies, acquisitions by large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have raised several Svetlicinii教授在克羅地亞南部城市杜布羅夫尼克的2023年競爭法與政策會議上作學術報告 Prof Svetlicinii presents his research at the 2023 Competition Law and Policy Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia.
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